Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly by Basu, Kaushik
KLSHVII'.R
economics
letters
Economics Letters 49 (1995) 459-464
Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly:
An explanation based on managerial incentives
Kaushik Basu
Department of Economies, Uris Hail. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14H53-7601, USA 
Received 15 December 1994; accepted 16 February 1995
Abstract
This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in □ duopoly, if an owner’s decision to hire a manager 
is modeled explicitly, then the subgame perfect equilibrium may coincide with the Stackelberg solution. 
Interestingly, this can happen even when the cost of hiring a manager is the same for the owner of each firm.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to suggest a new explanation for Stackelberg leadership in a 
duopoly. There is a growing literature that theorizes about why there may be a Stackelberg 
outcome in some duopolies and which firm will be the leader (see, for example, Gale-Or, 
1985, and Boyer and Moreaux, 1987). The present paper shows that if owners of firms are free 
to delegate output decisions to managers appointed by them, then in the subgame perfect 
equilibrium a duopoly may equilibrate at a Stackelberg outcome. I proceed by adapting the 
models of Vickers (1984), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) so as to allow 
owners of firms a larger and more realistic menu of choices.
In Fershtman and Judd, and Sklivas, attention is restricted to a class of linear contracts that 
owners may offer to the managers. After the owners have done so, each manager decides how 
much to produce. In these papers, however, the employer's decision to hire or not hire a 
manager is not explicitly modeled. In effect, the existing models look at the case in which the 
managers are already installed in the firms.
If, however, the decision to hire a manager is endogenous, then these models yield a very 
interesting possibility. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that for a class of 
parameters, the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies lead to production levels that are
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exactly equal to what would happen under Stackelberg leadership. Wc then identify the 
conditions under which a particular firm becomes a Stackelberg leader.
2. I'he model
In this section a related version of the Vickers. Sklivas. and Fershtman and Judd model is 
outlined, A duopoly faces the following inverse demand function:
p ~ a -  b(x: + x 2) ,
where a, b > 0. p is price and xt is firm i's output. Firm i's cost of producing xt units is given 
by CfX,. As usual, firm i's profit function and sales function are given by. respectively,
71, -  77, (a , , X2 ) =  (fl “  b ( x y + X2) ~ C, )X, , ( I)
and
5, = S,(x,, x 2 ) = (a -  b(x, + x 2 ))x, . (2)
In order to make the hiring decision explicit let us suppose that in period 1 the owners of 
firms decide whether to hire managers or not, In particular, each owner i selects m, E {(), 1}, 
where mt = 0 means owner i docs not hire a manager and w, = 1 means i does hire a manager. 
Once a manager is chosen and the manager's objective function specified, which happens in 
period 2, the manager decides how much to produce (in period 3). In the absence of a 
manager the decision (in period 3) is taken by the owner.
In period 2 each owner (who has a manager) picks an objective function for the manager. 
Manager i's objective function can only belong to the following class.1
R, = R,{<*;, x } , .V, ) -- 0 ,77, + ( I -  a, )$, . (3)
In other words, owners 1 and 2 select a, and a2, respectively, in period 2, Actually, manager i 
is told that her salary is
A, + B,R, ,
where A, and B, are constants. Clearly, maximizing A l + BjRl and maximizing (3) arc 
equivalent if the control variable is a,. Hence, when speaking of managerial behavior wc shall 
speak as if the manager’s objective function were /?,(<*,,a , , a2).
A, and Bt are chosen by owner i to simply ensure that the participation constraint is 
satisfied; that is, A, + BIRI in equilibrium happens to be equal to the manager’s reservation 
income. Let us suppose that manager/’s reservation income is Y.. In addition, assume that the 
owner finds that he can get away from the firm for several hours once he has a manager. Let
See, also, D'AsprcmotU and Gerard-Varet (1980). Fershtman (1988) and Katz (1986).
X, be the amount that owner / can earn elsewhere in the time that gets released in this 
manner. Hence owner’s Fs cost of hiring a manager is
Z, = Y , -  X , . (4)
Owner Fs net profit, if he hires a manager, will be tt, — Zt.
It seems reasonable to assume Z, > 0. This is because an owner cannot put all his time in 
another trade even if he has a manager. He will still have to do some supervision. What is 
interesting and at first sight counter-intuitive is that Staekelberg leadership can arise even 
when Z, = Z2.
The model of Fershtman-Judd and Sklivas is a special case of the above game; namely, one 
in which in period 1, = (I, 1) is given. The subgame that occurs after this coincides
exactly with their model and the subgame perfect equilibrium of this .subgame wall be referred 
to as an ‘incentive equilibrium’. The values taken by at, x f and ir, in such a subgame perfect
equilibrium are given by
a,. =  (8 c, -  a -  2c,) /5c, , / , (5)
x, =  (2a -  6c, +  4 c , ) /5b , j #  i , (6)
t t , = 2(tf-3c, + 2c,)2/25b . (7)
It follows from (3) that
x, =argmax ,v1?x2) =  (a -  bx2 — o r,c, )/2b . (8)
I shall refer to (8) as the managerial reaction function of firm /. The owner’s reaction function, 
referred to here as simply the reaction function, is dearly the special case of (8) with a, = 1. 
By solving the two equations in (8), with i = 1,2, we get .r,(<*,, a2) and A'2(a ,, a,). By inserting 
these in (1) w'e get tt, as a function of (a, ,ar?). By treating this as the pay-off function of a 
normal-form game (where a, and tt2 are the strategic variables), and solving for the Nash 
equilibrium, we get d, and uy, Then tt, in (7) is derived by replacing x } and x2 with *[(<*,, d2) 
and A%(d,, ay). 3
3. The Stackleberg solution
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game described in Section 2 -  namely, a game 
in which the hiring decision is an explicit one -  however, need not coincide wfith the incentive 
equilibrium described in (5)-(7). For a certain class of parameters it would, in fact, coincide 
with the standard, textbook Staekelberg equilibrium. In most conventional treatments, a 
Staekelberg solution is either assumed or directly deduced from an exogenously-imposed 
temporal structure of moves. At times it is motivated by pre-entry configurations (as in, for 
example, Basu and Singh, 1990) but it is left at the level of motivation. In the present model, 
the occurrence of Staekelberg is more endogenous, and who will be leader depends on the cost 
parameters of the model.
To see this, Jet us first cheek what happens after each possible one-period history. We have 
already seen what happens after (m,, m 2) — (1, 1). Next, consider the case (ml7 m 2) = (0, 0); 
that is, no one hires a manager. This gives us the standard Cournot case and as is easily 
worked out or, even more easily, lifted from some microeconomics textbook, firm fs  profit in 
the Cournot equilibrium is given by
7rm = ( a - 2 c , + c i)2/9b.  (9)
Finally, and without loss of generality, consider the history (m ,, m 2) = (0, 1). This case is 
solved in Fcrshtman (1985). Since m, =0 , firm l ’s reaction in period 3 is the owner’s reaction 
function, given by setting / = 1 and a, = L in (8). This is described by AB  in Fig. 1.
Let CD be owner 2’s reaction function, Since, by choosing a 2, owner 2 can make any line 
parallel to CD firm 2’s managerial reaction function, it is obvious that in period 2 owner 2 
would choose a2 such that the managerial reaction function is CD",  which is a line that goes 
through point S, which is standard Stackelberg outcome with firm 2 as leader. The line 7r2 is 
firm 2’s iso-profit curve.
The profit earned by firm 1 at point S in Fig. 1 is denoted by ttu:, The subscript is explained 
by the fact that firm 1 is a ‘follower’ at point S. The computation of 7rir. is standard:
77n. = (a — 3cj + 2c2y / 16/) , (10)
7t2F is symmetric.
If 77]L is l ’s profit when 1 is Stackelberg leader, it is easy to check that
^ il = ifl “ 2cj +cz)2I8b . (11)
Fig. I.
Recalling that hiring a manager costs firm 1, Z , , owner 1’s pay-offs that occur in the subgame 
perfect equilibria of the subgames that occur after the four possible period-1 histories, 
(0, 0), ( J , 1), (0, I), (1,0), are summarized in the following partial pay-off matrix:
Owner 1
Owner 2
0 I
’Jr] N  ' F i N 77 ] [- ' ^ Z L  ^ 2
7T]L — Z, , 7T2P 7Tl — Z\ , TT2 — Z 2
The incentive equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game only if 
TTi-Z, 2=7t1[; and 7r2 -  Z 2 2s 7r2F. It is easy to work out these conditions in terms of the 
exogenous parameters of the model. If, on the other hand.
tt,f > 7t, — Z x or, equivalently, Z, >
l{a -  3c, + 2c2)2 
400ft ( 12)
and
7r2L Z2 > 7t2N or, equivalently, 72ft - > Z ( 13)
then a subgame perfect equilibrium of this model coincides with the standard Stackelberg 
outcome with 2 as leader.
From (12) and (13) it follows that the equilibrium is likely to coincide with the Stackelberg 
outcome with firm 2 as leader if (i) firm l's marginal cost of production is high, relative to firm 
2’s marginal cost and (ii) Z, is high relative to Z 2.
Since Z, and Z2 are the costs of hiring a manager, it may at first sight appear that the 
Stackelberg result is being driven by (ii). However, surprisingly, even if Z, = Z2 = Z, (12) and 
(13) can be satisfied. All we need is that
7(a - 3 c, +2c,)2 _ (« ~2c2 + c ] ) 2
400ft <  Z "" 72ft (14)
And this can be true if c, is sufficiently high compared with c2. Note, however, that if Z = 0, 
then (14) cannot be true and, therefore, that Stackelberg cannot occur.
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